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Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory
of the Law of Armed Conflict
Eric Talbot Jensen*

Abstract
The current bifurcated conflict classificationparadigm for applying the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) has lost its usefulness. Regulation of state militaries was originally based on
the principle that the armedforces of a state were acting as the sovereign agents of the state and
were grantedprivileges and given duties based on that grant of ageng. These privileges and
duties became the bases for the formulation of the modern LOAC During the twentieth
century, the LOAC became bfurcated, with the complete LOAC appying only to armed
conflicts between sovereigns and only few provisions of the law applying to armed conflicts that
were not between sovereigns. This hfuration has led to a lack of clarity for the sovereign's
agents in LOAC application and given states the ability to mantjulate which law applies to
application offorce through their agents. The applicability of the LOAC should no longer be
based on the manpulable and unclear conflict classification paradigm, but should instead
return to its foundations in the sovereign's grant of ageng. Thus, anytime a sovereign applies
violentforce through its armedforces, those armedforces should apply the full LOAC to their
actions, regardlessof the type or classefication of the conflict.
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I. INTRODUCTION
War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust. It must recogni.Ze that the old
wineskins of internationallaw, domestic criminaiprocedure,or otherpriorframeworks are
ill-suited to the bitterwine of this new wafare. We can no longer afford diffidence. This
war has placed us notjust at, but alread)past the leading edge of a new andfrzghtening
paradgm, one that demands new rules be written. Fallingback on the comfort ofprior
practicessupplies only illusory comfort. 1

In the aftermath of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, thenAssistant Attorney General Jay Bybee argued in a memo to Department of
Defense General Counsel William Haynes that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply to either al-Qaeda or the Taliban, essentially leaving these battlefield

IAl-B ihani v Obama, 590 F3d 866, 882

PDC Cir 2010) (Brown concurring).
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fighters in a "no-law" zone.2 Additionally, White House Counsel, Alberto
Gonzales, notoriously described provisions of the Geneva Conventions as
"quaint" and "obsolete." Many who have since reviewed Bybee's memo have
declared that this was a disingenuous reading of the law and that the Bush
Administration was manipulating its interpretation of the law and US Treaty
obligations to accomplish specific policy objectives.' In the end, the US Supreme
Court forced the Bush Administration to change its interpretation of the
application of the law,' but debate continues on the issue of what law applies.'

2

Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, US Dept of justice, Appeation of Treaties
and Laws to alQaedaand Taliban Detainees, *5 (Jan 22, 2002).

3

Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, Application of the Geneva
Convention on Prisonersof War to the Confict with AlQaeda and the Taliban *2 (Jan 25, 2002).

4

Jason Ryan, Torture Investigation: Bush-DOJ Attorneys Exerised Poorjudgment' (ABC News Feb 19,
2010), online at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/torture-investigation-president-george-bush-eradoj -attorneys/story?id=9892348 (visited Oct 12, 2011).

s

In Hamdan v Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court stated:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common
Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being
"international in scope," does not qualify as a "conflict not of an international
character." That reasoning is erroneous. The term "conflict not of an
international character" is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between
nations. So much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the
Convention's provisions on its application." Common Article 2 provides that
'the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties.' High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all terms of
the Conventions vis-a-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a
nonsignatory "Power," and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if "the
latter accepts and applies" those terms. Common Article 3, by contrast,
affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the
Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a
nonsignatory "Power" who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of' a
signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict
described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash
between nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, the phrase "not
of an international character" bears its literal meaning.
548 US 557, 630 (2006) (citations omitted). See also Memorandum from Gordon England,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Application of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees, *1 (July 7, 2006).

6

Professor Yoram Dinstein writes:
Sometimes, while the scale and effects of an armed clash between States are
substantial, both sides stick to a fiction (which does not miror the true state
of affairs and need not be accepted by third States) that a mere incident "short
of war" has occurred. Conversely, the issuance of a declaration war does not
mean that hostilities will necessarily ensue, so that a technical state of war may
remain technical. Nonetheless, it is clear that since war must be waged
between two or more States, figures of speech like "war on terrorism" must be
taken as metaphorical. A "war on terrorism" may segue into a real war whenlike in Afghanistan in 2001--one State (the United States) went to war against
another (Afghanistan) owing to the support given by the latter to terrorists.
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As the above quote from the 2010 DC Circuit case of AI-Bibani v Obama reflects,
the terror attacks and the US government's response sparked a decade of
consternation that has pervaded governments, practitioners, and academics
concerning the applicability of the law to the actions of transnational terrorists.
At the root of the arguments by Gonzales, Bybee, and others is the law of
armed conflict's (LOAC) applicability paradigm established by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions' and broadened by their subsequent 1977 Additional Protocols.'
These Conventions and Protocols were promulgated against the backdrop of the
proliferation of intra-state conflicts involving organized armed groups that were
not state forces, but were using state-level violence to carry out armed conflicts.'
The LOAC provided no protection for either non-State participants in such
conflicts or victims. Organizations such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (JCRC) argued to extend the existing laws of armed conflict to these
internal conflicts.'o States resisted the ICRC's suggestion because they viewed
these conflicts as areas where international law had no purview."
Recognizing state resistance but still committed to extending the coverage
of the LOAC to victims in these internal armed conflicts, the ICRC proposed in
1949 to bifurcate the LOAC into provisions pertaining to armed conflicts
between states, termed international armed conflicts (IAC), and armed conflicts
between state forces and other organized armed groups within that state, termed
non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). The intent was not only to provide
But usually the "war on terrorism" is prosecuted through ordinary law
enforcement measures or even incidents "short of war," without waging an allout war.
Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War,27 Harv J L & Pub Poly 877, 886-87 (2004).
7

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field (1949), 75 UN Treaty Ser 31 (1950) (First Geneva Convention); Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (1949), 75 UN Treaty Set 85 (1950) (Second Geneva Convention); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), 75 UN Treaty Ser 135 (1950)
(Third Geneva Convention); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (1949), 75 UN Treaty Set 287 (1950) (Fourth Geneva Convention) (collectively, Geneva
Conventions).

8

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977), 1125 UN Treaty Ser 3 (1979)
(API); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (1977), 1125 UN Treaty Set 609
(1979) (APII) (collectively, Protocols).

9

In the decades following the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the world saw an increase in
non-international armed conflicts, including wars of national liberation, terrorist organizations and
irregular forces working within a failing State. Recent examples include activities of the Taliban,
Hizbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic Courts Union, and Al-Shabbab.

10

See Section II.

II

See id.
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greater protections to victims of armed conflict, but also to encourage the armed
groups to comply with the LOAC.
States finally agreed to this methodology, which was included in the 1949
Geneva Conventions as Article 3.12 At the urging of the ICRC, many states
extended this bifurcation in 1977 through the promulgation of two Protocols to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These Additional Protocols solidified the
bifurcation and, for those states who became parties,' 3 added great detail to the
provisions applying in both IAC and NIAC.
From the beginning, the intent of the ICRC (and presumably of the states
who acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols) was to add
protections to the victims of armed conflict and encourage greater compliance
with LOAC across a wider range of conflicts. However, history shows that this
bifurcation has had little effect, if any, on non-state compliance with the
LOAC14 and has mainly acted to limit states who seek to be compliant. Further,
as illustrated by the case of the US' response to the war on terror, it has focused
the application of law almost exclusively on conflict classification. If a State calls
an armed conflict an IAC, it is bound by one set of duties and authorities, and if
it calls it a NIAC, it is bound by another. Further, if it avoids calling a conflict an
armed conflict at all, it can use its armed forces to do things that are not covered
by the LOAC, thus potentially creating the "no law" zone the US sought with
regard to terrorists.
In addition to the US' dilemma, recent events in Colombia,"5 Russia, 6 and
Mexico 7 demonstrate this problem. By focusing on the conflict classification,
whether an IAC, NIAC, or even as something other than armed conflict at all,
states are able to determine the law that applies as a matter of policy, rather than
as a matter of fact.
12
13

Geneva Conventions (cited in note 7).
For a list of states party to API, see API at 396-434 (cited in note 8). For a list of states party to
APII, see APII at 667-98 (cited in note 8).

14

See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by
Non-State Actors, 98 J Crim L & Criminol 711, 807-08 (2008) (arguing that states' ability to
manipulate conflict classification encourages noncompliance by non-state actors).

1s

See Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Investigate Spate ofKillings by Armed Groups (July 8, 2011), online
at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011 /07/08/colombia-investigate-spate-killings-armed-groups
(visited Oct 28, 2011) (cataloguing recent attacks on civilians by armed groups and calling on the
Colombian government to investigate and intervene).
See Paola Gaeta, The Armed Confict in Chechnya Before the Russian ConstitutionalCourt, 7 Eur J Ind L
563 (1996) (discussing the decision by the Russian Constitutional Court to declare Russia's
conflict with Chechnya as subject to API).
See Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War The Casefor Non-InternationalArmed Conflict Classification,

16

17

34 Fordham Intl L J 1042, 1088 (2011) (arguing that Mexico has not officially declared its
situation against the drug cartels as a NIAC, but that it should do so).
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The inherent problems with the IAC/NIAC bifurcation are not recent
discoveries. Almost immediately after the promulgation of the 1977 Protocols,
Professor Michael Reisman argued that the bifurcation would be inaccurate and
unnecessarily limiting." The ranks of detractors have grown since the US' war
on terror has so ably illustrated the shortcomings of the paradigm.
Governments," academics,20 and even ICRC officials21 now recognize that the
conflict classification paradigm for LOAC applicability is not sufficiently
meeting its originally intended goals. While there are many detractors of the
current system, there is no general agreement on how to move forward in fixing
the gaps in the existing law.22 No one has suggested an alternative to the current
focus on conflict classification as the method of determining which law applies.
This Article argues that the international community's focus on conflict
classification to determine which law applies is misplaced and does not facilitate
application of fundamental LOAC protections. Rather than using the type or
existence of armed conflict as the gauge for LOAC applicability, this Article
argues that states should apply the full LOAC every time they utilize their armed
forces as state agents to apply sovereign force. This turns the focus from what a
state chooses to call a conflict to the forces a state chooses to use to deal with a
conflict. Application of the LOAC to all forceful activities by state sovereign
forces is drawn from the historical development of the LOAC and will provide a
more solid foundation upon which to place the LOAC, diminishing the potential
for political manipulation of the law.
Applying the sovereign agency theory of the LOAC, rather than the
conflict classification paradigm, will avoid the current pervasive debate between

18
19

20

21

2

See Theodor Meron, et al, Applicaion of HumanitarianLaw in NoninternationalArmedConflicts, 85 Am
Socy Intl L Proc 83, 85 (1991).
See John Reid, 20th-Centuy Rules, 21st-CentuU Conflict, Remarks at the Royal United Services Inst for
online
at
3,
2006),
(Apr
Security
Studies
Defense
and
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0604/doc05.htm (visited Oct 14, 2011).
See Avril McDonald, The Year in Review, 1 YB Intl Humanitarian L 113, 121 (1998); Rosa
Ehrenreich Brooks, War Eveywhere: Rights, NationalSecuriy Law, and the Law ofArmed Conflict in the
Age of Terror, 153 U Pa L Rev 675, 755-56 (2004).
See Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC President, Sixty Years of the Geneva Conventions: Learningfrom the Past
to Better Face the Future, Address at the Sixtieth Anniversay of the Geneva Conventions (Aug 12, 2009),
online
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventionsstatement-president-120809.htm (visited Oct 14, 2011); Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC President,
StrengtheningLegal ProtectionforVictims ofArmed Conflicts, Address at the Follow-UpMeeting to the Sixteth
21,
2010),
online
at
the
Geneva
Conventions
(Sep
Anniversat
of
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/ihl-development-statement210910.htm (visited Oct 14, 2011).
John B. Bellinger and Vijay M. Padmanabban, Detention Operations in ContemporaU Conflicts: Four
Challengesfor The Geneva Conventions and Other Exising Law, 105 Am J Intl L 201, 204 (2011).
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IAC and NIAC that has caused so much consternation. In addition, applying the
full LOAC every time a state uses its armed forces will mean that the starting
point for humanitarian protections is always the most robust of possible
alternatives. It will provide clarity for armed forces, making them more efficient
and effective. History has shown that applying the full LOAC to all forceful
activities of a state's armed forces is a manageable approach, though it has only
been done as a matter of policy to this point. For the sovereign agency theory of
LOAC applicability truly to overcome the problems inherent in the conflict
classification paradigm, however, it must be accepted as a matter of law.
In arguing that the "full LOAC" should apply when a state employs its
military to exercise sovereign force, this would include those customary
provisions that normally apply during IAC as well as any conventional
obligations imposed by a state's specific treaty obligations. As will be further
explained in Section V, despite the positive law that makes clear distinctions
between the law applicable in NIAC and the law applicable in an IAC, the
practice of states, judicial decisions of international tribunals,24 and the writings
of scholars25 all demonstrate that the gap between the customary law applicable
in NIAC and IAC is decreasing. Some key areas of difference still remain, such
as combatant immunity26 and occupation. While these are definitely critical areas
of the LOAC, they represent only a small portion of the LOAC as a whole.
Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, with respect to the sovereign
agency theory presented herein, the LOAC refers to the LOAC as it currently
applies in IAC to any individual state. This includes the application of human
rights law as appropriate. 27 Arguing to apply the full body of the LOAC will
trigger concerns by states such as those raised in prior negotiations as catalogued
below. 28 Despite these valid arguments by states, the benefits of the sovereign
agency theory to a state's armed forces outweigh the traditional concerns about
applying the full LOAC to situations other than IAC.
Section II of this paper describes the current paradigm of LOAC
applicability based on conflict characterization and includes a brief historical
review of the bifurcation of the LOAC into provisions regulating NIAC and

23

See Section V.E.1.

24

See Section V.E.2.

25

See Section V.E.3.

26

Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance ofPOWStatus, 45 Harv Intl LJ 367, 376 (2004).
Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed

27

Conflict, 98 Am J Intl L 1, 34 (2004); Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical
Limit of Appying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J Intl Humanitarian Legal Studies 52
(2010).
28

See Section II.
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IAC separately. Section III then reviews the effect of the bifurcation of the
LOAC to show that it has not been effective either in curbing the violence
against victims of armed conflict or in promoting LOAC compliance by
participants in armed conflict, but instead has become a political tool to
manipulate the applicable law, leading to a lack of clarity on the battlefield. The
section will also highlight the increasing call to dissolve the bifurcation. Section
IV argues that looking to the type of armed conflict for LOAC applicability is no
longer sufficient to preserve the fundamental principles of the LOAC. Rather,
states should apply the LOAC to any use of armed forces to apply sovereign
force. This proposal reemphasizes the underlying principle of agency and is
expressed most significantly in the sovereign state's granting that agency to
members of its armed forces. Section V outlines the benefits of the sovereign
agency theory and argues that history supports its application. Finally, Section VI
analyzes some recent developments that have positioned states to make just such
a transition in the law and offers a way forward to complete the transition.
II. THE CURRENT BIFURCATED PARADIGM
"[The terms 'international'and 'non-internaional'conflict import a btjartite universe
that authoriZes only two reference points on the spectrum offactualpossibilities.The terms
are based on a polig decision that some conflicts. .. will be insulatedfrom the plenary
applicationof the law of armedconflict-even though such conflicts may be more violent,
extensive and consumptive oflfe and value than other 'international'ones. The terms are,
in effect, a sweeping exclusion device thatpermits the bulk of armed conflict to evadefull
internationalregulation. This exclusion is not one that comports easily with the manfest
polig ofthe contemporary law of armed conflict, which seeks to introduce as many
humanitarianrestraintsas possible into conflict, withoutjudgments about its provenance,
its locus, or about thejusice of either side's cause."29

By the early nineteenth century, states recognized two principal forms of
armed conflict: armed conflict between two or more states and civil wars.30
Interstate conflict, or what has become known as IAC, invoked all the principles
of the laws of war as they were then understood. During civil wars, on the other
hand, states often did not apply such international rules and the treatment of
opposing fighters was considered a matter of domestic concern. This difference
of application "was based on the premise that internal armed violence raise[d]
questions of sovereign governance and not international regulation." 3 1

29
30

31

Meron, et al, 85 Am Socy Intl L Proc at 85 (cited in note 18).
Emily Crawford, Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinction between
Internationaland Non-InternationalArmedConflicts, 20 Leiden J Intl L 441, 442 (2007).
James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definiion of Armed Confit in InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A
Critique of InternaionaliZedArmedConf&t, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross 313, 316-17 (2003).
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The middle of the nineteenth century began a time of progressive
codification of the LOAC. Starting with the Lieber Code of 1863, states wrote
and applied rules to their armed conflicts." Such treaties and conventions
moved the development of the LOAC forward, expanding its coverage and
raising the level of detail in its provisions.34 In addition to States, one of the
organizations that played a significant role in LOAC development was the
ICRC. The concept of the ICRC originated in Henri Dunant's experience after
the Battle of Solferino35 and his determination to provide assistance to victims of
armed conflict. Initially, the ICRC's work focused on conflicts between
sovereign states. However, the ICRC soon recognized the plight of victims of
civil wars, or non-international armed conflicts, to which the LOAC did not
extend. As early as the 1912 IXth International Conference of the Red Cross,
meeting in Washington, DC, the ICRC presented a report entitled "The Role of
the Red Cross in case of Civil War or Insurrection," which contained a draft
convention extending some rights under the LOAC to victims of civil wars. This
initiative was not well received by the majority of the participants, who felt that
"the Red Cross Societies have no duty whatever to fulfil [sic] toward rebel or
revolutionary troops, which the laws of [a] country can only consider as
criminals.""
Despite this setback, the ICRC continued to advance the idea of codifying
protections for victims of non-international armed conflicts. At the Xth
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Conference adopted a resolution
that "recognized that victims of civil wars and disturbances, without any
32

US War Dept, Instructionsfor the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (1863), online at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument (visited Oct 14, 2011) (Lieber Code).

33

Interestingly, the US Civil War was a NIAC, yet the rules Lieber promulgated to govern Union
forces in the conduct of that armed conflict came to be the basis for the formulation of modern
IAC law.

3

See, for example, Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight (Declaration of Saint Petersburg), 138 Consol TS 297 (1868);
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague Convention of
1899), 32 Stat 1803 (1899); Final Act of the Second Peace Conference (The Hague Convention of
1907), 36 Stat 2277 (1907); Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (The Kellogg-Briand Pact), 46 Stat
2343, 94 League of Nations Treaty Set 57 (1928).

35

See generally Henry Dunant, A Memoy ofSoferino (Intl Comm Red Cross 1986).
Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Applicable in Armed Conflcts, 5 Protection of Victims of Non-Intl Armed Conflicts 1 (Intl Comm
Red Cross 1971), online at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_.Law/pdf/RC-conferenceVol5.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2011). See also Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva
Protocol on Non-InternationalArmed Confcts, 30 Intl & Comp L Q 415, 418 (1981) (describing
general hostility by states toward conferring protection on insurgents).

36
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exception, are entitled to relief, in conformity with the general principles of the
Red Cross."" Though the resolution had no binding effect on states, it reflected
a thaw in the opposition to applying basic international law protections to armed
conflicts more broadly.
In 1938, in the wake of the Spanish Civil War, the ICRC convened the
XVIth International Conference of the Red Cross in London. At the
Conference, the "question of non-international armed conflicts was given
attentive study by the legal commission of the Conference, which recognized all
the difficulties inherent in it." 3 8 In the end, the members of the Conference were
still unwilling to apply the LOAC directly to non-international armed conflicts
that, in their view, invaded the prerogative of the sovereign. The result was that
the members of the Conference only agreed to increased study by the ICRC on
31
the application of humanitarian principles during civil wars.
World War II exhibited an exponential rise in wartime costs to civilians,
both in terms of lives lost and property damage.' Increasingly lethal weapons
led to increased effects on civilians.4' In the aftermath of the war, the ICRC
embarked on another review of the LOAC. This effort resulted in the ICRC's
submitting proposals for rules applicable in cases of non-international armed
conflict to the XVIIth International Committee of the Red Cross in Sweden in
1948. After reviewing the ICRC's submissions, the members of the Conference
"recognized the innumerable difficulties which were going to be raised by the
problem of non-international armed conflict, and [they] suggested that this
question be referred to the [upcoming] Diplomatic Conference." 42
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, which would ultimately produce the
Geneva Conventions, the ICRC reiterated its previous call to apply the full
LOAC to non-international armed conflicts. While some delegates were in favor
of the changes and viewed acceptance of the ICRC's proposals as an "act of

37

Conference of Government Experts at 2 (cited in note 36).

38

Id at 2-3.

39

See id at 3.

4

See Ronald R. Lett, Olive Chifefe Kobusingye, and Paul Ekwaru, Burden of Injug During the
Complex Political Emergeng in Northern Uganda, 49 Canadian J Surgery 51, 53 (Feb 2006) ("The
proportion of civilian war-related deaths has increased from 19% in World War I, 48% in World
War II, to more than 80% in the 1990s."). See also Lisa Avery, The Women and Children in Conflict
Protection Act: An Urgent Callfor Leadershly and the Prevention of Intentional ViaimitZadion of Women and
Children in War, 51 Loyola L Rev 103, 103 (2005) ("During the last decade alone, two million
children were killed, another six million were seriously injured or left permanently disabled, and
twice that number of children were rendered homeless by the ravages of war.").

41

See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'UnprivilegedBelkgereng': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 Brit YB
Intl L 323, 326 (1951).
Conference of Government Experts at 2 (cited in note 36).

42
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courage," 43 the majority remained opposed to such a sweeping measure. Those
opposed argued that:
To compel the Government of a state in the throes of internal convulsions
to apply to these internal disturbances the whole body of provisions of a
Convention expressly concluded to cover the case of war would mean
giving its enemies, who might be no more than a handful of rebels or
common brigands, the status of belligerents, and possibly even a certain
degree of legal recognition.44
The issue was sent to a Mixed Commission that was tasked with examining
articles that were common to all four proposed Conventions. Within these
"common" articles were those that determined the applicability of the LOAC. In
accordance with the traditional approach, Article 2 of the Conventions described
the conflicts to which the full LOAC would apply. Article 2 states:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention
in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof. 45
This paragraph poses two significant limitations to the application of the
Conventions. The first is that there must be an armed conflict, and the second is
that it must be between two High Contracting Parties. With the Geneva
Conventions universally adopted,4 6 the effect of this limitation is to restrict the
applicability of the Conventions to armed conflicts between states. This, of
course, was not what the ICRC and others were seeking. They wanted a broader
application of the LOAC.

43

Jean Pictet, ed, Commentary:I Geneva Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field44 (Intl Comm Red Cross 1952).

44

Id at 43-44.

45

Geneva Conventions (cited in note 7).

46

For a list of states party to the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian law
treaties, see International Committee of the Red Cross, State Paries to the Following International
HumanitarianLaw and OtherRelated Treaties as of 13-Oct-2011 (Intl Comm Red Cross 2011), online at
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf// 28SPF/29/party-main-treaties/$File/IlHL andother-related_
Treaties.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2011).

Winter 2012

695

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

In response to the ICRC's desire for a broader application of the LOAC, a
small working party was formed to "draw up a text containing definitions of the
humanitarian principles applicable to all cases of non-international conflicts,
together with a minimum of imperative rules."47 Drawing from general
preambular language and rules originally intended for the preamble to the
convention concerning civilians,48 the working group produced the provision
that would eventually become Common Article 3,49 which provides limited
protections for those who are involved in non-international armed conflicts,
including for fighters not acting under the direction of a sovereign. Article 3
states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status
of the Parties to the conflict.50

47

Pictet, Commentary: I Geneva Convention at 47 (cited in note 43).

48

Id.

49

Geneva Conventions, Art 3 (cited in note 7).

50

Id.

696

Vol. 12 No. 2

Applying a Sovereign Ageny Theory of the Law ofArmed Conflict

Jensen

Like Article 2, Article 3 only applied to armed conflicts, but in contrast to Article
2, Article 3 was specifically applicable only to those armed conflicts not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the states party.
A sensible reading of this language might lead the reader to think that the
drafters meant Article 3 to cover the complete field of conflicts taking place in
the territory of a signatory not covered by Article 2-and eventually the US
Supreme Court decided just thatst-but it is clear that this was not the intention
of the parties at the time the Conventions were drafted.5 2 Although not explicit
in either the text or commentary, the records of the Conventions clearly show
that most states believed that Common Article 3 would only apply when the
fighting reached "the threshold of intensity associated with contemporaneous
international warfare" and opposing armed groups forced the state to respond
with its armed forces. 53 The states party also believed that this provision was
actually meant to govern civil wars or insurrections,54 and that they were not
considering conflicts with transnational non-state actors." The ICRC viewed
this restricted scope as only a limited success; they recognized that these
provisions represented only the "most rudimentary principles of humanitarian
protection.""
Despite the minimal effect of Common Article 3 in extending protections
to victims of NIAC, its creation signified the beginning of the application of the
LOAC to NIACs, an area that previously had been governed almost solely by
domestic law. Though application of the complete LOAC was rejected, there
was now, at least, some recognition among states that NIACs were no longer
exempt from the direct application of international law.
Since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the majority of
conflicts that have occurred throughout the world have been non-international

51

Hamdan, 548 US at 630-31.

52

Anthony Cullen, The Concept ofNon-IntemationalArmedConfict in InternationalHumanitanan Law 37
(Cambridge 2010). See Baxter, 28 Brit YB Intl L at 323 (cited in note 41) (arguing that the
treatment of certain guerrillas and saboteurs is outside the coverage of the Geneva Conventions).

53

Cullen, The Concept ofNon-InternationalArmedConftct at 37 (cited in note 52).

54

For statements by the US delegation to this effect, see DiplomaticConferencefor the Establishment oftbe
InternationalConventions for the Protections of War Victims, Final Record of the D/omatic Conference of
Geneva of 1949, Vol 2B at 12 (1949), online at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military__Law/RC-FinRecDipl-Conf-1949.html (visited Oct 14, 2011).

55

See Lt Col Robert F. Grubb, Army Intl Affairs Division, Dept of Def Geneva Conventions
Working Group, Memorandum for Record, Analysis of the Geneva Conventions 3-2 (1955)
(memorandum prepared by the Dept of Def Geneva Conventions Working Group in anticipation
of Senate hearings) (on file with author); Cullen, The Concept ofNon-IntemadonalArmed Conflict at 37
(cited in note 52).
Stewart, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross at 317 (cited in note 31).

56
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in character.17 In its assessment of these armed conflicts, the ICRC determined
that Article 3's numerous loopholes "made it no longer possible to ensure
sufficient guarantees to the victims in question."" The ICRC responded by
continuing its efforts to expand protections for victims of all armed conflicts.
At the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross held in Vienna in
1965, the members adopted Resolution XXVIII, which included principles for
the protection of civilians in armed conflict, without regard to how that conflict
was characterized. These principles were subsequently adopted in UN General
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2444 on Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflict. Article 1 of the Resolution states:
1. 'Affirms' resolution XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the
Red Cross held at Vienna in 1965, which laid down, inter alia, the following
principles for observance by all governmental and other authorities
responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring
the enemy is not unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations
as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking
part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect
that the latter be spared as much as possible.59
The ICRC/UNGA Resolution is significant for two relevant reasons. First, the
Resolution makes no distinction between various types of armed conflict. On its
face, the Resolution applies equally to all forms of armed conflict. Second, the
Resolution calls on all governments to apply to all forms of armed conflict
principles previously understood to apply only to IACs, again without concern
for the characterization of the conflict. While the principle of distinction
described in paragraphs (b) and (c) is one of the most fundamental principles of
the LOAC and is designed to protect victims of war, it is important to note here
the ICRC's urging for a new application of the LOAC to armed conflict
generally. In keeping with this new approach, "the legal studies of the ICRC
were broadened to cover all the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts,
because the insufficient character of the rules relative to the conduct of
hostilities often affected the application of the Geneva Conventions in conflicts
of all sorts."O
57

See Michelle Mack, Increasing Respect for InternationalHumanitarian Law in Non-InternationalArmed
at
online
2008),
Cross
Red
(Intl
Comm
*5
Conflicts
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002_0923.pdf (visited Oct 19, 2011).
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Conference of GovernmentExperts at 7 (cited in note 36).
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General Assembly Res No 2444, UN Doc A/RES/2444 at 11 (1968).
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Conference of GovernmentExperts at 7 (cited in note 36).
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The ICRC's next move, in furtherance of its twin objectives of broadening
the protections of victims of armed conflict and encouraging compliance with
the LOAC, was to submit a draft to a Conference of Government Experts in
1971, recommending the application of the full LOAC to civil wars if a foreign
military became involved.6 ' The ICRC's efforts were successful on this point,
and the resulting Report of the Government Experts on the issue of applicability
of LOAC to non-international armed conflicts proposed:
When, in case of non-international armed conflict, the Party opposing the
authorities in power presents the component elements of a State-in
particular if it exercises public power over a part of the territory, disposes of
a provisional government and an organized civil administration, as well as of
regular armed forces-the Parties to the conflict shall apply the whole of
the international humanitarian law applicable in international armed
conflicts. 62
Eventually, the ICRC put forward its proposals to the Conference of State
Parties. Finding that the majority of states in the Conference preferred to
maintain the distinction between IACs and NIACs, the ICRC abandoned the
In preparation for the 1977 Diplomatic
"single protocol" approach.'
Conference, the ICRC proposed two separate protocols, one dealing with IAC
and one with NIAC. These two proposals provided the basis for the Additional
Protocols, the adoption of which ultimately solidified the bifurcation of the
LOAC.
The bifurcation of the LOAC is clearly expressed in the applicability
paragraphs of each Protocol. API, Article 1, paragraphs 3 and 4 state:
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred
to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations. 64

61

See Stewart, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross at 313 (cited in note 31).

62

Conference of Government Experts at 15 (cited in note 36). The same report also concluded that when

63

64

a third State becomes involved in the conflict, the entire LOAC should apply. Id at 21.
Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmerman, eds, Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 1330, 4387 (Martinus Nijhoff
1987).
API, Art 1 TT 3-4 (cited in note 8).
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By referring to Common Article 2 in paragraph 3, API is designed to apply to
the standard IAC. However, paragraph 4 carves out a significant change in that
understanding by including three types of conflict that had traditionally been
considered NIACs. Despite the argument made in the Commentary that
conflicts waged against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes
should be considered to be inter-state, 5 their inclusion in API shows that the
differentiation between IACs and NIACs was one of political expediency, rather
than a principled division of LOAC application. 6 In other words, the
transformation of conflicts waged against colonial domination, alien occupation,
and racist regimes from being governed by the law relating to NIACs to that
regulating IACs had little to do with the factual nature of the conflicts and much
to do with the political mood at the time.
In contrast to the expansionist scope of API, the applicability provision of
APII draws a more limiting line. Article 1 states:
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing
conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not
covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. 67
Using Common Article 3 as a basic point of reference, paragraph 1 artfully limits
the coverage of APII by requiring the armed groups be under responsible
command, exercise control of territory, and have the capacity to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations. The Commentary confirms the
limiting purpose of the Protocol, stating "the Protocol only applies to conflicts
65

See Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Commentary at 41-56,

66

See Stewart, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross at 318-19 (cited in note 31) ("[The inclusion of such conflicts
within the scope of Article 1(4) confirms that the dichotomy between international and noninternational conflict is far from strict or principled: international armed conflict is not a synonym
for inter-State warfare, nor does the full extent of international humanitarian law presuppose that
the collective belligerents must be States."). See also Crawford, 20 Leiden J Intl L at 449 (cited in
note 30); Cullen, The Concept of Non-InternationalArmed Conflict at 83 (cited in note 52) ("The
motivation behind [codifying wars of national liberation as international armed conflicts] was
intrinsically political.").

67

APII, Art 5 (cited in note 8).
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of a certain degree of intensity and does not have exactly the same field of
application as common Article 3, which applies in all situations of noninternational armed conflict."" Thus, it appears that the same group of states
who were sympathetic to those trying to rid themselves of external pressures,
such as those mentioned in API, were not as sympathetic to the idea of
opposing domestic groups wanting to have the same rights within their own
territory under APII.
Nevertheless, APII did successfully extend many humanitarian provisions
to those who qualified under the Protocol. Michael Schmitt observed that:
Additional Protocol II contained articles addressing the protection of
children, detainees, internees, the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, and set
forth restrictions on prosecution and punishment. Perhaps most
importantly, it established a protective regime for the civilian population,
including prohibitions related to targeting, terrorizing, or starving civilians;
dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations; cultural and religious
objects and places of worship; the forced movement of civilians; and relief
agencies and humanitarian assistance.69
All of these had been previously unrecognized within the context of NIACs.
Therefore, the extension of such protections to civilians was a significant
development in the LOAC, appearing, at least, to increase substantially the
protections for the victims of armed conflict.
The legal effect of the promulgation of the API and APII was the
cementing of conflict classification as the standard for LOAC application. The
Protocols divided the application of the law into two categories and assigned
rights and responsibilities within them, effectively requiring a threshold question
regarding conflict characterization in every discussion of applicable law. As
Emily Crawford has observed, "characterization of the conflict is crucial to
determining what level of protection is provided for combatants and civilians."O
Unfortunately, the conflict classification paradigm for determining the
applicability of the LOAC and the corresponding legal protections provided
during armed conflict has proven ineffective. As will be demonstrated by the
next section, rather than encouraging states and non-state actors to provide
greater protections for victims of armed conflict, it has instead incentivized
states to manipulate the conflict classification to limit the protections they must
provide on the battlefield.

68
69

Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Commentay at 1348,1 4447 (cited in note 63).
Michael N. Schmitt, Militay Necessity and Humanity in InternationalHumanitarian Law: Preserning the
Delicate Balance, 50 Va J Intl L 795, 810 (2010) (citations omitted).
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Crawford, 20 Leiden J Intl L at 449 (cited in note 30).
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III. INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE BIFURCATION
"Underthese circumstances, and in the absence of an impartialbody chargedwith
authoritatively determining the status of armedconflicts, it isfair to assume thatparties
will characteriZe conflicts in terms that best suit their own interests."

As mentioned earlier, the bifurcation of the LOAC applicability paradigm
was solidified with the promulgation of the two Additional Protocols. The
international community's response to the promulgation of API and APII was
mixed: many hailed them as a great humanitarian breakthrough, while others
faced the promulgation of API and APII with determined skepticism.7 2 The US'
view at the time of promulgation is particularly insightful with respect to the
perceived problems with the provisions of the Additional Protocols. While the
US believed that many of the provisions of the Protocols were already
customarily binding and that others were significant advancements in the
LOAC," certain specific provisions caused serious concern.
Although some viewed API as fundamentally flawed,74 it is really APII that
should be the test of the bifurcation's effectiveness in dealing with NIACs. APII

71

Stewart, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross at 344 (cited in note 31).

72

Even though the UK eventually ratified API, it took more than twenty years, and they issued
sixteen statements at the time of signing to clarify their interpretation of the treaty. See Letter
from Christopher Hulse, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, to the Swiss Govt (Jan 28, 1998),
at
online
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9EO3FOF2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocume
nt (visited Oct 14, 2011); Schmitt, 50 VaJ Intl Lat 813 (cited in note 69).
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See Martin D. Dupuis, John Q. Heywood, and Michele Y.F. Sarko, The Sixth AnnualAmetican Red
Cross-lashingtonCollege of Law Conference on InternadonalHumanitanan Law: A Workshop on Customay
InternadonalLaw and the 1977 ProtocolsAddiional to the 1949 Geneva Convendons, 2 Am U J Intl L &
Poly 415, 419 (1987), citing Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the
Relation of Customay International Law to the 1977 Protocols Addiional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Address to the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Wlshington College of Law Conference on International
HumanitarianLaw (1987); id at 460, citing Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, US Dept of State,
The Position of the UnitedStates on CurrentLaw of WarAgreements: Remarks (Jan 22, 1987).
When President Reagan sent the Protocols to the Senate, his letter of transmittal made exactly this
point. He characterized API as "fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed" and stated that "we
cannot allow other nations of the world, however numerous, to impose upon us and our allies
and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful price for joining a convention drawn to
advance the laws of war." Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal to the US Senate (Jan 29, 1987),
reprinted in 81 Am J Intl L 910, 911 (1987).
At the heart of the US' objection was the potential degradation of the principle of distinction.
Article 44.3 of API, while couched in terms of protecting the civilian population, may in fact
provide a license for fighters not to distinguish themselves as battlefield participants and still
receive the benefits of civilian protections. According to Abraham Sofaer, the US Department of
State Legal Advisor at the time, this rule would allow fighters to "hide among civilians until just
before an attack." Dupuis, Heywood, and Sarko, 2 Am U J Intl L & Poly at 460 (cited in note 73).
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has many important provisions, including the incorporation of a number of IAC
provisions into the NIAC legal paradigm." The US had fewer objections to
APII than to API, but the limiting criteria for the application of provisions in
APII offered states few opportunities for application of the Protocol's

It now appears that Sofaer's prediction has become reality. See Ben Farmer, Taliban Plans to Melt
into
Civilian
Population,
(Telegraph
Feb
10,
2010),
online
at
htrp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7205751 /Taliban-plans-to-meltaway-into-civilian-population.html (visited Oct 14, 2011); Statement of Jakob Kellenberger, Sixty
Years of the Geneva Conventions, 1 9 (cited in note 21) ("[C]ombatants do not always clearly
distinguish themselves from civilians, neither wearing uniforms nor openly carrying arms."). But
see generally Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 Yale J Intl L 102 (2011)
(cataloguing armed conflicts where the armed groups have voluntarily accepted the obligations to
conform with international law as contemplated in API, Art 96). If every person on the battlefield
who decides to take up a weapon will accrue the same privileges as a uniformed combatant, even
if he chooses to not wear a uniform and mark himself as a target, he has no incentive to
differentiate himself. It seems obvious that encouraging battlefield fighters to fight as civilians will
inevitably lead to more civilian casualties as combatants struggle to distinguish the fighters
amongst the civilians.
As Schmitt observes, another primary concern with API was that it would "place rebel groups on
an equal footing with the armed forces by affording them the more comprehensive protections of
the law of international armed conflict, even though their actions demonstrated a disdain for law
generally." Schmitt, 50 Va J Intl Lat 812 (cited in note 69).
The author has argued elsewhere that, despite the ICRC's intent with API to encourage LOAC
compliance and extend coverage of full LOAC protections to situations previously not known as
IAC (such as fights against racist regimes, alien occupation, and colonial domination), the
Protocol has had the opposite effect. Instead of encouraging armed groups to comply with the
LOAC, it has incentivized them to fight from within civilian populations, effectively bringing the
hostilities even closer to the civilians. Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ's 'Uganda Wall': A Barrierto the
Principle of Distinction and an Enty Pointfor Lawfare, 35 Denver J Intl L & Poly 241, 251-57 (2007);
Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition for Parlial
Comphance, 46 Va J Intl L 209, 226-31 (2005).
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See, for example, APII, Arts 7 (protection and care of the wounded), 8 (obligation to search for
the wounded), 9-11 (protection of medical personnel and equipment), 12 (the ICRC emblem), 13
(protection of the civilian population), 14 (protection of objects indispensable to the population),
15 (works containing dangerous forces) (cited in note 8).
See id. President Reagan also transmitted APII to the Senate. Schmitt describes the view of the
President and State Department:
Despite the altered balance symbolized by Additional Protocol II, President
Reagan submitted the instrument to the Senate in 1987 for advice and consent.
In his letter of transmittal, the President opined that the agreement was, with
certain exceptions, a positive step toward the goal of "giving the greatest
possible protection to the victims of [noninternational] conflicts, consistent
with legitimate military requirements." The Legal Adviser to the State
Department characterized the instrument's terms as "no more than a
restatement of the rules of conduct with which United States military forces
would almost certainly comply as a matter of national policy, constitutional
and legal protections, and common decency."
Schmitt, 50 Va J Intl Lat 811 (cited in note 69) (citations omitted).
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protections. In fact, in the years since ratification, the vast majority of claims
under APII to an armed conflict have come from international bodies or third
party states and not from the state within whose borders the conflict is
occurring."
Instead, states have tended to avoid the applicability of these Protocols to
their conflicts." State arguments supporting this resistance take various forms.
Some states, such as Israel, claim to be involved in a conflict that does not fit
into either category but is in a different category altogether." Or, as discussed in
relation to the US in the introduction to this paper, states argue that for various
reasons, the categories do not apply, or, at least, the law does not apply. As will
be discussed below, Mexico is also hesitant to apply officially Common Article 3
or APII to its current fight against narcotics trafficking.so These are but a few
examples that highlight the manipulability of the conflict classification
methodology.
By dramatically restricting the number of conflicts to which its provisions
would apply (protections under APII can only be triggered by sufficiently broad
violence), the bifurcation model has effectively withheld international
protections for the victims of armed conflicts unless the host state is willing to
admit that the internal struggle has reached the stage where their opposing
armed groups control territory and can conduct sustained and concerted military
operations. Such a government statement would have the natural effect of
legitimizing those armed groups with whom the state is involved in the domestic
conflict.' This powerfully disincentivizes states to take such action, with the
practical effect of denying critical protections to victims in these types of armed
conflicts.
Furthermore, often no clear distinction exists between different types of
armed conflict or between armed conflicts and lesser uses of force. For example,
there is now almost always some form of third state involvement in internal
armed conflicts, prompting the designation of a whole new category of armed
conflict, that is, "internationalized armed conflict."8 2 In Colombia, "[t]he armed
dissident movements have developed a confusing combination of alliances and

77
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See Cullen, The Concept ofNon-InternationalArmedConfict at 110 (cited in note 52).
See Gaeta, 7 EurJ Intl L at 568 (cited in note 16).
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See HCJ 769/02 Pub Comm Against Torture in Isr v Govt of Isr [2005] Isr SC 57(6), online at
http://www.icj.org/IMG/Israel-TargetedKilling.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2011). See also Curtis A.
Bradley, The UnitedStates, Israel & Unlawful Combatants, 12 Green Bag 2d 397, 401 (2009).

so

See Section IV.
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See Roberts and Sivakumaran, Yale J Intl L at *27 (forthcoming) (cited in note 74) (discussing
State hesitancy towards any acts that might lead to legitimization of armed groups).
Stewart, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross at 315 (cited in note 31).
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simultaneous clashes with other actors in organized crime. The armed dissident
groups have also developed ties with the drug trade, where they frequently levy
taxes against drug producers and transporters in exchange for protection."8
Blurring lines between categories only adds further complication to the existing
classification scheme that determines the applicable law in a given situation.
In the end, the bifurcated system has developed such that there is a danger
that states will manipulate the law for political purposes, choosing how they
intervene in the affairs of another state as a means of ensuring that particular
provisions of law will apply to the conflict. As Stewart put it:
States and non-state actors have proved equally willing to favour or
fabricate accounts of foreign participation in internal conflicts for their own
wider political gain. As a result, the characterization of armed conflicts
involving international and internal elements, and the applicable law that
flows from that characterization, are frequently "the subject of fierce
controversy of a political nature." 84
While this type of manipulation of the law for political purposes is certainly not
a new phenomenon, with regard to the LOAC, it demonstrates that the
bifurcation of applicable law has not worked. Instead of accomplishing the
desired goals of protecting victims and encouraging state compliance, the
bifurcation of the LOAC has had the opposite effect.
The problem has been well noted in the past decade, with increasing calls
for dissolution of this bifurcated system between IAC and NIAC. James Stewart,
writing for the ICRC on this point, argues, "Commentators agree that the
distinction is 'arbitrary,' 'undesirable,' 'difficult to justify,' and that it 'frustrates
the humanitarian purpose of the law of war in most of the instances in which
war now occurs."' 85 Schindler agrees:
Why should the victims of a war of secession, such as in Biafra and
Bangladesh, be less protected than those in a war against colonialism or a
racist regime? Of course, one can answer that it is just as wrong to treat
victims of international and non-international armed conflicts differently. As
long as humanitarian international law distinguishes between international
and non-international conflicts, such injustice will be inevitable.86
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Jan Romer, Killing in a GrayArea Between HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights: How Can the National
Police of Colombia Overcome the Uncertainty of Which Branch of InternationalLaw to Apply? 11 (Springer
2010), quoting Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. Doc. 9 rev. 1 (1999).
Stewart, 85 Ind Rev Red Cross at 342 (cited in note 31) (citations omitted).
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This sentiment was also echoed in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Tadid case."
These and a host of other similar statements" highlight the illogic of the
existing bifurcation, particularly from the standpoint of desiring to protect
victims. How can it possibly be argued that victims in NIAC are less deserving
of international protections from the ravages of armed conflict than those in
IAC?" Equally troubling is the proposition that, unless a state voluntarily admits
that it is in an NIAC, the state has no obligation to apply the basic protections
of Common Article 3 to the victims of that armed conflict. 0 Certainly these
civilians-most often citizens of the host country-deserve equal protection as
those in an IAC from the ravages of the state's armed forces. Clearly, in light of
all of these concerns, it is time to reexamine the paradigm of LOAC application.
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In addition to the quote beginning Section V, the Tadid Appellate Court also argued that "[i]f
international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must
gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the [bifurcation between
IAC and NIAC] should gradually lose its weight." Prosecutor v Tadid, Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No IT-94-1-I, 1 97 (Oct 2, 1995).
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Meron, et al, 85 Am Socy Intl L Proc at 85 (cited in note 18) (citing Michael Reisman's remark
that the bifurcated system serves as "a sweeping exclusion device that permits the bulk of armed
conflict to evade full international regulation").

89

See Crawford, 20 Leiden

90

[I]mplementation is intimately linked to applicability, and applicability goes
directly to the issue of distinction between types of armed conflict. Moreover,
where there are tiers of applicability, where the practical situations are
equivalent but those affected are treated differently, then compliance and
enforcement will always be a problem. The promotion of gradations of
humanitarian concern will always leave open the possibility of favoring the
lowest permissible level of treatment. Therefore, the reasons for creating a
unified approach, with no possibility of "lower" levels of treatment, become
more compelling.
One might argue that civilians are not left unprotected in these situations, but are covered by
domestic law and international human rights law. This might be true to the degree that states
apply these laws any better than they apply Common Article 3. However, the argument of this
paper is that international law has proscribed a lex spedals during armed conflict and that the lex
spedals should be sufficient to provide meaningful protections in the situations in which it applies
as a matter of fact. It is unsatisfactory to say that it is not necessary for the applicable law to
provide adequate and meaningful coverage because another set of laws will fill the gap. If the law
of armed conflict should apply based on the facts of the situation, it is that law that must be
sufficient for the situation.

J Intl L at 483-84

(cited in note 30), arguing:
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IV. THE SOVEREIGN AGENCY THEORY OF LOAC
APPLICABILITY
"War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and
individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citiZens, but as soldiers;
not as members of their countU, but as its defenders. .

.

. The object of war being the

destruction of the hostile State, the other side has a right to kill its defenders while they are
bearing arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrenderthey become once more
merely men, whose lfe no one has any right to take."91

As outlined above, governments, scholars, and practitioners hody debate
the applicability of the LOAC to various conflicts around the world.92 These
arguments almost exclusively revolve around the determination of the existence
of an armed conflict and the subsequent characterization of that conflict as
either an IAC or a NIAC. The continuing debates demonstrate not only the
impotence of the current LOAC applicability paradigm, but also illustrate the
validity of the sovereign agency theory.
Rather than continue to rely on the current paradigm where
characterization of the conflict determines the applicable law, states should
return to the roots of the application of sovereign force and combatancy-the
principle of agency. Any time a state deploys its military to an armed conflict, it
imbues those forces with agency and exempts them from the individual
consequences of traditional criminal activities, such as murder and destruction.
As long as a member of the military is acting as the state's agent and taking
advantage of this immunity, the full provisions of the LOAC should apply,
including the protections for victims of armed conflict.93
A. Sovereignty and the Development of the LOAC
While rules regulating warfare have existed since the beginning of recorded
history of war,94 they have not always been regularized in their application.' The

92

Dieter Fleck, ed, Handbook of InternationalHumanitarianLaw 19-20 (Oxford 2d ed 2008), quoting
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Sodal Contract and Discourses 11 (J.M. Dent 1920), online at
http://forms.lib.uchicago.edu/lib/hathi/info.php?q=oclc:23420750 (visited Dec 8, 2011).
See notes 21-23.

93

See Section IV.D.1.

94

See, for example, William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal to
Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 Miss L J 639, 697-710 and n 12 (2004); Thomas C. Wingfield,
Chivaly in the Use of Force, 32 U Toledo L Rev 111, 114 (2001); Gregory P. Noone, The HistoU and
Evolution of the Law of War Priorto World War 11, 47 Naval L Rev 176, 182-85 (2000).
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See Fleck, ed, Handbook of InternationalHumanitarianLaw at 8-10 (cited in note 91) (describing the
development of several areas of international law).
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seventeenth century opened on a scene of savage warfare that caused Hugo
Grotius to write:
I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of
which even barbarous nations should be ashamed; men resorting to arms
for trivial or for no reasons at all, and when arms were once taken up no
reverence left for divine or human law, exactly as if a single edict had
released a madness driving men to all kinds of crime. 96
Grotius authored one of the seminal works in international law in an attempt to
right this uncontrolled culture of violence.
Later that same century, the Treaty of Westphalia solidified states as
sovereigns and the primary actors in the international community.97 It also
empowered states with the monopolization of violence through standing armies
and navies.9" As sovereigns acted to bring state-level violence under their control
and organize standing armies, a system of agency developed between sovereign
and soldier. As the quote from Rousseau at the beginning of this section
indicates, the soldier was not viewed as an individual but as an agent of his
sovereign until such time as he could no longer fight or laid down his arms.
Then, he reverted to his status as an individual and was treated as such.
The monopolization of legitimate violence through the use of sovereign
forces was never absolute, but was nonetheless given recognition. In response to
this recognition, the laws and customs regulating warfare grew to focus on how
the sovereign's armies and navies used force." Because members of the standing
army and navy were acting in the sovereign's name and at his will-as his
agents-they were granted certain privileges and correspondingly were required
to comply with certain duties. One of the most important privileges of being the
state's agent was the principle of combatant immunity. Under the developing
law, personal acts of violence in the course of armed conflict did not carry
individual criminal responsibility.' As long as the soldier or sailor was acting on

96

Id at 19.

97

But see Jordan Paust, Nonstate Actor Partic fadon in InternationalLaw and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51
Va J Intl L 977, 1003-04 (2011) (arguing that though states play a primary role, there is clearly a
strong role for non-state actors).

98

See Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles 81-90, 96-118 (Knopf 2002); Frederic Gilles Sourgens,
Posiutism,Humanism, and Hegemony: Sovereignty and Security for Our Time, 25 Pa State Intl L Rev 433,
443 (2006) (citing sixteenth-century writer Bodin as defining sovereignty as the "absolute and
perpetual power of commonwealth resting in the hands of the state").

99

See Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at 509-19 (cited in note 98); Ambassador Richard S. Williamson,
The Responsibiity to Protect and the Darfur Crisis, Remarks at Pokg Salon (May 18, 2009), online at
http://www.sea-dc.org/news/221.html (visited Oct 15, 2011).

100 See The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, A Treatise on the jurdicalBasisof the Distinction

Between lawful Combatant and Unprivileged Belbgerent 14 (1959) (on file with author); Allison Marston
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the bidding of his sovereign and in compliance with the rules that were
developing to govern that use of force, he was granted immunity for his warlike
acts.
This combatant privilege and its ties to sovereignty are reflected in the US'
"Instruction for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,"o10
issued under the direction of President Lincoln during the American Civil War.
Article 57 of the Lieber Code, as it has come to be known, clearly ties the idea of
combatancy and combatant immunity to the grant of the sovereign. "So soon as
a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of
fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not
individual crimes or offenses."' 02 The prerequisite to the privilege was being
armed by the sovereign and taking the oath of fidelity to the sovereign's wishes.
Correspondingly, in TAC, those who are the agents of the state traditionally
have had the responsibility to distinguish in their warfare between those who are
likewise agents of the opposing sovereign and those who are not and direct their
hostilities only against those who are.' 03 This duty for state agents to limit their
violence to those engaged in combat is known as the principle of distinction and
is one of the foundational principles of LOAC.104 Because traditional inter-state
war is fought between sovereigns represented by their armed forces, the citizens
of the state are neither considered participants nor targets in that armed conflict
and therefore benefit from the duty for state forces to distinguish.
In application of this principle of distinction, states reciprocally recognized
that the agents of the state are granted individual immunity for what would
otherwise be criminal acts, because they are not performing those violent acts on
a personal level, but as the agent for the sovereign. As long as the soldier acts
within his agency, he is immune from personal responsibility for his warlike
Danner, Bejond the Geneva Conventions: Lessonsfrom the Toko Tribunalin Prosecuting War and Terrorism,
46 VaJ Int L 83,101 (2005).
101 Lieber Code (cited in note 32).
1o2

Id.

103

API Article 48 states, "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives." API, Art 48 (cited in note 8). See
also Lieber Code (cited in note 32).
See W. Michael Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 Am J Intl L 852, 856
(2006) ("At the very heart of the law of armed conflict is the effort to protect noncombatants by
insisting on maintaining the distinction between them and combatants."). See also Michael N.
Schmitt, The Principle of Discriminationin 21st Centuy Warfare, 2 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 143, 144
(1999); Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Fafade:A CriticalLook at the Current Law on Targeting the
Will of the Enemy andAir Force Doctrine, 51 AF L Rev 143, 146 (2001). The modern formulation of
the principle of distinction is found in API Article 48. See note 103.
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acts. 0 s However, the moment a combatant steps outside of his role as agent and
directs his attacks against a civilian who is not acting as an agent for the
opposing sovereign, he opens himself up to personal responsibility for his
actions.'
Because the tradition, practice, and reciprocity that had evolved from the
granting of agency to a sovereign's military revolved around interstate conflicts,
states had not allowed those rules to diffuse into other types of armed conflict
prior to the bifurcation of the LOAC system. This division unhinged the
foundation of LOAC formulation from the granting of agency to a sovereign's
actors to conflict classification. Current conflicts demonstrate that a return to
sovereign agency as the primary determiner of LOAC applicability, including an
expansion into all armed conflicts, will resolve some difficulties that have
developed from the LOAC bifurcation paradigm.
B. Sovereign Agency Applicability
Rather than the current LOAC bifurcation paradigm, states should accept a
theory of expanded sovereign agency and apply the full LOAC every time they
utilize their armed forces to apply sovereign force. Acceptance of this paradigm
turns the focus from how states choose to label a conflict to the types of forces
a state employs in a conflict.
Three illustrations of conflicts in which the current paradigm falls short of
creating a clear answer for LOAC applicability are presented below. In each, the
applicability of the LOAC under an agency theory would be completely clear.
C. The No-Law Zone
As the introduction section of this Article highlights, the Bush
administration argued that the attack by transnational terrorist organizations
against the United States on September 11, 2001 did not fit neatly within the
current bifurcated paradigm of LOAC applicability. Based on a simple textual
reading, as understood by the states at the time of promulgation, the Bush
administration asserted that the conflict with al-Qaeda was neither an IAC,
because there were not two states at war with each other, nor a NIAC, because it

105

Article 57 of the Lieber Code states, "So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and
takes the soldier's oath of fidelity he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are
not individual crimes or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of a certain
class, color, or condition, when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public
enemies." Lieber Code, Art 57 (cited in note 32).

106

Id at Art 44.
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was not a traditional civil war and because of the transnational nature of alQaeda.'07
The arguments on each side of this issue have been openly debated and are
not important to the purposes of this Article.'s It is sufficient here to simply
draw attention to the fact that the debate exists. For the law to remain so unclear
regarding its applicability to situations as critical to the international community
as the attacks of September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks reflects poorly
on the value of the legal paradigm. The Bush administration applied the law in a
way that best suited its purposes. In doing so, it manipulated the law to
accomplish the US' policy aims. The LOAC ought not to lend itself to such
manipulation.
Under an agency paradigm, once the US determined it was deploying its
armed forces to use violence against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the applicable law
would be a non-issue. The deployment of the state's armed forces would require
the full application of the LOAC. And for those members of the military who
were called on to apply that law, the clarity would likely be a welcome relief.'
D. The "Not Armed Conflict" Claim
Under the current LOAC applicability paradigm, to reach the level of
"armed conflict" requires a certain quality of hostilities. As the Commentary
states:
The expression "armed conflict" gives an important indication in this
respect since it introduces a material criterion: the existence of open
hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser
degree. Internal disturbances and tensions, characterized by isolated or
sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore constitute armed conflict in a
legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort to police forces or
even to armed units for the purpose of restoring law and order.11o
An obvious difficulty with this paradigm is the fact that a state must determine if
the violence occurring within its borders has risen to the level of a NIAC. A
state has a significant disincentive to do this, because once the conflict is termed
a NIAC the state must accept certain international law obligations and apply
specific portions of the LOAC. Such a decision places significant burdens on the
state. Further, the last sentence of the above quote from the Commentary is
107
10s

See Gonzales, Application of the Geneva Convention at *2 (cited in note 3).
See, for example, Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future ofJustice in the Age of Terror
(Penguin 2008); Intl Comm of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent jurists
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Counter-terrorism, and

Human

Rigbts
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(2009),

online

http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011).
109

See Section V.C.

110
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troubling. It allows the use of armed forces for the purpose of restoring law and
order, but places this situation outside even the application of Common Article
3. Such a result would potentially leave military forces applying sovereign
violence in a domestic situation with no applicable international legal paradigm
upon which to base their use of force decisions.
The current situation in Mexico illustrates this dilemma.' For the past
several years, Mexico has been involved in a battle against illegal drug cartels to
"ensure [Mexico's] future as a nation."" 2 The violence has been well
documented and far exceeds the death totals in Afghanistan for the same
period.1 1 3 The situation is such that many are concerned that Mexico will
become a failed state.114 In response to the escalating violence, Mexico has
deployed almost 50,000 military and police forces, working side by side to face
the well-armed and well-trained "forces" of the cartels, which some estimates
place at around one hundred thousand."' The military forces have been given
"policing powers" and are already coming under fire for civilian abuses and
arbitrary arrests."' As a result of these alleged abuses, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights urged Mexico's government to try soldiers in civilian courts,
rather than military tribunals"-a recommendation that it appears the Mexican
Supreme Court has adopted."'
It is unclear what rules the Mexican military and police are applying to their
engagements with the cartel forces. When cartel members are captured, it
appears they are being tried as criminals under domestic law, without reference

111 For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Bergal, 34 Fordham Intl L J at 1042 (2011) (cited in
112

note 17).
Attorney General Leading War on Mexico Drug Cartels Resigns (Fox News Sept 8, 2009), online at
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-story/0,3566,547568,00.html (visited Oct 15, 2011)
(citing remarks by Mexico Attorney General Eduardo Medina-Mora).

113

See Sara A. Carter, EXCLUSITE: 100,000 Foot Soldiers in Mexican Cartels (Wash Times Mar 3,
2009), online at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/03/1 00000-foot-soldiers-incartels/ (visited Oct 15, 2011); US to Boost Mexico BorderDefence (BBC News Mar 25, 2009), online
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/7961670.stm (visited Oct 15, 2011).

114

See Carter, Foot Soldiers (cited in note 113); US to Boost Mexico Border Defence (cited in note 113).
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See Attorney GeneralLeadingWar (cited in note 112).

116

See Mexican Court Orders Citifian Trialsfor Troops Accused of Rights Abuse (RTT News July 13, 2011),
online at http://www.rttnews.com/Content/MarketSensitiveNews.aspx?Id=1664267&SM=1
(visited Oct 15, 2011).
See Mexico Abuse Cases Should be in Civilian Court (Fox News May 20, 2011), online at
(visited Oct
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/05/20/mexico-abuse-cases-civilian-court/
15, 2011).
See Mexican Court OrdersCivilian Trials (cited in note 116).
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to international law."' The scope and intensity of this conflict appear clearly to
meet the level of "armed conflict" envisioned in the Protocols. Nevertheless,
Mexico has not conceded that this conflict is an "armed conflict" and has not
agreed to apply the provisions of APII to the situation. 20
This situation in Mexico is another example of how the current LOAC
applicability paradigm is failing to provide clarity in armed conflict or work
toward greater compliance. In contrast, under the agency theory, once Mexico
decided to deploy the military to combat the violence from the cartels, the
military would have no question about what law to apply. In applying the full
LOAC, the principles of distinction, targeting, and civilian immunity would bind
the Mexican forces as a matter of law. The power of this change, with its
obvious benefits to the victims of armed conflict, seems clear.
E. Special Armed Conflicts
Under the current bifurcated LOAC paradigm there is no category for
"special" armed conflicts. However, the State of Israel, in its dealings with the
occupied territories, has resisted the claim that the conflict is either an IAC or a
NIAC. Instead, governmental statements and Supreme Court decisions have
described the conflict in various ways,12' making arguments which are rooted in
conflict classification for LOAC applicability. For example, Israel's ministry of
defense is hesitant to call the conflict an NIAC for fear of providing some form
of international legitimacy to its enemies.122
Under the sovereign agency theory, Israel's deployment of its forces to use
and combat violence would clarify the requirement for Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) to apply the LOAC in every military operation within the occupied
territories. This would include both targeting principles and the principle of
distinction.12' The LOAC trigger would be the deployment of the IDF, not the
119

120
121

122
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See Ray Walser, US Strate Against Mexican Drug Cartels: Flawed and Uncertain, 2407 Backgrounder
*1
(Heritage
Foundation
Apr
26,
2010),
online
at
http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/201 0/pdf/bg 2407.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011) (suggesting
the institution of Mexican drug courts).
Mexico has not signed APII. See APII at 667-99 (cited in note 8) (listing signatories).
For various decisions and statements concerning the characterization of the conflict in Israel, see
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Rule of Law in Armed
http://www.adhonline
at
Israel,
Project
Conflicts
geneva.ch/RULAC/applcable-international1aw.php?id-state=113 (visited Oct 15, 2011).
See Public Committee againstTorture in Israel,1 22 (cited in note 79) (discussing the delicate balance in
international human rights law between humanitarian considerations and military need and
success).
I do not mean to imply that I think the IDF is not applying these principles now. However, I
believe that the application of the LOAC lacks clarity to the international community.
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government's decision on conflict classification. Because the trigger would be
automatic upon deployment of the IDF, it would not serve to legitimize those
with whom the IDF was fighting.
F. Disaster Relief: Non-Application
It is important to point out that under an agency theory, not all uses of the
military would be governed by the LOAC-only those where the state intends
to use sovereign violence in fulfilling its mission. There have been many recent
deployments of military forces to provide assistance after a natural disaster.'24 In
such cases, it is not the intention of the state to use violence as a means of
accomplishing its objectives. Where disaster relief deployments are domestic,
and armed forces stay within the borders of their own state, the sovereign is not
anticipating the use of sovereign force and may deal with any resulting criminal
violations under its domestic laws.
Additionally, where deployment is to another host state that has suffered
the disaster, the LOAC would not apply. As in the domestic setting, in cases
involving a host state, the sovereign is not sending its forces in its name with the
intention of doing violence. Hence, the state does not expect its forces to be
governed by the LOAC with its accompanying privileges and immunities. In
most of these cases, the status of the deploying forces is governed by a "status
of forces agreement" or an exchange of letters between the host state and the
sending state.125 Depending on the substance of the agreement, a member of the
military who commits criminal activity in the host nation is subject to that host
nation's domestic laws and does not benefit from the sovereign's grant of
immunity. 126
The above examples illustrate situations in which the current LOAC
applicability paradigm does not provide the protections it is intended to provide.
Transition to an agency theory where the military is governed by the LOAC any
time it is used as the sovereign's agent to do violence would provide clarity to an
area of international law and benefit states in many practical ways.
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See Matthew Lee and Julie Pace, ObamaHaiti Earthquake Response: 'We Have To Be There For Them
at
13,
2010),
online
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Jan
Need'
(Huff
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/13/obama-haiti-response-we-h_n_421770.html
(visited Oct 15, 2011).
See Chris Jenks, A Sense of Duty: The Illusory CriminalJurisdiction of the US/Iraq Status of Forces
Agreement, 11 San Diego Intl L J 411, 418-22 (2010).
See Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook of the Law of Visiing Forces 5 (Oxford 2001); Paul J.
Conderman, Jurisdiction, in id at 103; Chris Jenks and Eric Talbot Jensen, All Human Rights Are
Equal,But Some Are More Equal Than Others: The ExtraordinayRendition ofA Terror Suspect in Italy, the
NATO SOFA, and Human Rights, 1 Harv Natl Sec J 171, 180-82 (2010).
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V. BENEFITS OF THE SOVEREIGN AGENCY THEORY
"What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed,in internationalwars, cannot but be
inhumane and inadmissible in civilstrife."1 27

Applying the sovereign agency theory of LOAC rather than the conflict
classification paradigm will avoid the current pervasive debate between IAC and
NIAC which has caused so much consternation. In addition, applying the full
LOAC every time a state uses its armed forces will mean that the starting point
for humanitarian protections is always the most robust possible. It will also
provide clarity for armed forces, making them more efficient and effective.
A. Avoiding the IAC/NIAC Debate
Applying the sovereign agency theory will reduce the misapplication and
manipulation of the current LOAC paradigm by states. Connecting application
of the LOAC with its responsibilities and privileges to a state's decision to
deploy its armed forces reinforces the LOAC at its foundation. If a state believes
a situation to be of such "intensity and scope" 128 as to warrant the engagement
of the armed forces, 129 then it is likely facing an external threat to its survival or
an internal threat to its monopolization of state-level violence. In its response to
such threat, the state will certainly claim the sovereign privileges from
prosecution for its armed forces. Additionally, the state will likely authorize the
use of force as a first response to the opposing forces. As Geoff Corn
persuasively argues, applying force as a first resort is one of the major
differences between the state's application of police force and armed military
force.'" In claiming these and other LOAC privileges, the state must also accept
the reciprocal responsibilities inherent in the LOAC, such as the aforementioned

127
128

129

130

Tadi at

119 (cited in note 87).
The ICRC Commentary to APII states, "[T]he Conference chose in favour of the solution which
makes the scope of protection dependent on intensity of the conflict. Thus, in circumstances
where the conditions of application of the Protocol are met, the Protocol and Common Article 3
will apply simultaneously, as the Protocol's field of application is included in the broader one of
Common Article 3. On the other hand, in a conflict where the level of strife is low, and which
does not contain the characteristic features required by the Protocol, only common Article 3 will
apply." Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Commentary at 1350, 1 4457 (cited in note 63).
The ICRC Commentary to APII states, "The term 'armed forces' of the High Contracting Party
should be understood in the broadest sense. In fact, this term was chosen in preference to others
suggested such as, for example, 'regular armed forces,' in order to cover all the armed forces,
including those not included in the definition of the army in the national legislation of some
countries (national guard, customs, police forces or any other similar force)." Id at 1352, 14462.
See Corn, 1 J Intl Humanitarian Legal Studies at 74-75 (cited in note 27).
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principle of distinction and proper targeting methodologies, in order to protect
civilians from becoming victims of the armed conflict.
An agency approach to LOAC application diminishes the potential for
state manipulation because it is unlikely that a state would avoid deploying its
armed forces against a force that threatened its survival or monopolization of
force, just to avoid application of the LOAC. The risks are too high. Though
now many states have robust police forces,' 31 where there is a threat to the state,
the state will likely employ its armed forces.
B. More Robust Baseline of Protections
From the perspective of victims of armed conflict, adopting the sovereign
agency theory of LOAC applicability will provide the most robust baseline of
protections. As explained in the introduction, applying the full LOAC under the
sovereign agency theory means that any time a state employs its military to apply
sovereign force, the members of the military will apply the LOAC applicable in
TAC. This body of laws is the most extensive and provides the most detailed and
robust protections for both victims of and participants in armed conflict.
Thus, under the sovereign agency theory, the military would always apply
the IAC rules when forces are used in a NIAC, regardless of whether the
conflict is a traditional counterinsurgency or one against transnational terrorist
organizations-such as the current conflict in Afghanistan. That means that all
the customary rules on weapons, attacks, targeting, and even detentionl32 would
apply. In addition, all conventional law obligations such as arms control,
weapons prohibitions, and other pertinent treaty obligations would also apply.
The application of this extensive body of law would likely increase the
protections for both victims of armed conflicts and those who participate in
them. Even if compliance with the LOAC is imperfect, as it certainly is, setting
the standard to meet the highest and most robust application of protections will
be a better starting point than allowing states to determine for policy purposes
which set of laws they desire to apply.
C. Clarity through Application to Armed Forces
From the perspective of participants in armed conflict, application of the
sovereign agency theory would also provide much needed clarity. Under the
current paradigm, states must determine what type of conflict they believe they

131 See Section V.E.3.
132 The application of IAC detention principles to a counterinsurgency will raise grave concerns by
states, particularly those who have not become parties to APII. See Section V.E.1.
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are participating in before knowing what law will apply.133 Or, more insidiously,
states may determine what law they want to apply and then characterize the
conflict appropriately. Even for those states who are not attempting to
manipulate the law, the increasing diversity in the types of missions for which
states are currently using their armed forces is sufficient to cause confusion and
political consternation with regards to providing their armed forces with
appropriate legal guidance as to the law to apply.13 4
These increasingly diverse types of missions include fighting non-state
organized armed groups,13 5 conducting counterdrug operations against narcotics
traffickers,'3 ' dismembering transnational criminal business networks,13 and
forcefully separating belligerents or implementing peace agreements."' In each
of these cases, there is much debate as to what type of conflict categorization
applies-if the LOAC applies at all. These real situations present concerns that
133 Crawford,
134

135

20 Leiden J Intl L at 443 (cited in note 30).

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) After Action Report, *64 (2004) (on file with author) (reflecting lack of information
from national level authorities on Rules of Engagement); Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 1st
Cavalry Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) After Acion Report, **19-20 (2005) (on file with
author) (reflecting lack of information from national level authorities on Detention Operations).
See, for example, Rbmer, Killing in a Gray Area at 2 (cited in note 83) (noting that in 2007,
Colombian military and police "officially killed 2,703 members of different 'guerrilla groups,' 'selfdefense groups,' and 'criminal bands"'). In 2008, the military and police killed 1,564. Id.

136 See, for example, Erica Werner and Jacques Billeaud, Obama Set to Send 1,200 Troops to Border(Huff
Post May 25, 2010), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/25/obama-set-to-send1200-tr n 589208.html (visited Sept 23, 2011); William Booth, Mexico's Crime Syndicates Increasingy
Target Authorities in Drag War's New Phase, (Wash Post May 2, 2010), online at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/01/AR2010050102869.html
(visited Oct 15, 2011).
137 See, for example, Cornelius Friesendorf, The Miitary and the Fight against Serious Crime: Lessons from
the Balkans, 9 Connections 45, 52-53 (2010) (showing that, while ineffective, the military still was
asked to take on this mission in Bosnia); United States Pacific Command, Our Mission, online at
http://www.pacom.mil/web/site-pages/staff%/20directory/jiatfwest/jiatfwest.shtml (visited Nov
2, 2011) ("Joint Interagency Task Force West combats drug-related transnational organized crime
to reduce threats in the Asia-Pacific region in order to protect national security interests and
promote regional stability."). See generally National Security Council, Stratep to Combat
at
online
Crime,
Organized
Transnaional
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime (visited Nov 2, 2011)
(talking about using all the elements of national power, including the military, to combat
transnational crime).
138 See Security Council Res No 1291, i 1, 4, 7-8, UN Doc S/RES/1291 (2000) (establishing the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in
order to facilitate the parties' fulfillment of their Ceasefire Agreement obligations as well as
authorizing MONUC to take "the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry
battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located [oint
Military Commission] personnel, facilities, installations and equipment,.. . and protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence").
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the current LOAC paradigm struggles to address. Such confusion is not helpful
to those participating in armed conflicts.
The UK Law of Armed Conflict Manual highlights the issue. Regarding
what law applies to armed conflicts, the manual states:
There is thus a spectrum of violence ranging from internal disturbances
through to full international armed conflict with different legal regimes
applicable at the various levels of that spectrum. It is often necessary for an
impartial organization, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to seek agreement between the factions as to the rules to be
applied. 139
If a third party is required to seek agreement on the applicable law, it seems
obvious that there exists a lack of clarity, which inevitably puts the armed forces
in an untenable situation of not knowing what legal standards to apply during
hostilities. Furthermore, if this decision of what law to apply is to be the matter
of negotiation between the parties, it will inevitably be politicized and prone to
manipulation based on policy considerations, rather than made as a legal
determination. While these policy battles are fought, military forces on the
ground are left with few legal answers.14 0
By way of example, in the Tadid jurisdictional appeal decision, the ICTY
characterized the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia "at different times and
places as either internal or international armed conflicts, or as a mixed internalinternational conflict."14 1 Of course, this type of a post-hoc determination about
conflict classification is completely unhelpful to the military facing a deployment
to the conflict zone. If trained jurists, such as those sitting on the ICTY, have to
struggle with these questions years after the conflict and with a clear view of the
facts and still respond that the conflict in question was of different types at
different times, how can one expect even the most well-meaning government to
be able to discern a clearer answer in advance and adequately prepare its armed
forces to apply the correct LOAC provisions at the applicable times and in the
appropriate ways?
From the perspective of the member of the military called on to apply the
LOAC, the sovereign agency theory provides much needed clarity and
simplicity. Militaries almost universally train to the IAC standards and then
adjust from those standards to meet other mission requirements.1 42 Having a
1 1.33.6
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UK Ministry of Defense, The joint Service Manual of the Law ofArmed Conjlct 17-18,
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See Marc L. Warren, The FirstAnnual Solf-Warren Lecture in Internationaland OperadonalLaw, 196 Mil
L Rev 129, 138 (Summer 2008) (describing the challenges faced by troops in Iraq when important
decisions were delayed by policy concerns).
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Tadid, 73 (cited in note 87).
See generally US Navy, US Marine Corps & US Coast Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, MCWP 5-12.1, COMDTPUB P5600.7A (2007); The
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commitment in advance that, regardless of the mission, militaries need only train
on and then apply the IAC standards would greatly increase the efficiency of
that training and the effectiveness of its application in the operational
environment.
In contrast to the lack of clarity under the current bifurcated LOAC
paradigm, under an agency theory of LOAC applicability, every time a state
deploys its military to use violence, it is clear that the full LOAC applies. The
standard is clear and straightforward in its application both by the state and by
the state's forces.
D. A Manageable Approach
Some may argue in response that applying the full LOAC is an
unmanageable approach-that states will not want to accept such a legal
obligation. However, recognizing the need for clarity across the many
contemporary missions that states assign to their armed forces, states are already
moving toward a default agency theory of LOAC applicability. This is best
illustrated in the practice of the US.
Since the end of the Cold War and the diminishing likelihood of great
power military confrontation, the US military has been used in a number of
other roles, including peace operations, disaster relief, humanitarian aid and
support for counterdrug operations. 143 These missions have often been termed
some version of "Operations Other than War," 1 " highlighting their nontraditional nature and distinguishing them from interstate armed conflict.
In response to these non-traditional missions, the US promulgated a policy
that "[m]embers of the [Department of Defense (DoD)] Components comply
with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other military operations."' 45 In other words, the US
military, as a matter of policy, has already implemented the agency theory of
LOAC applicability. The military recognized the benefit of clarity and the
Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflict- Manual,VR I 3 (1992); Canadian Ministry of National Defense, Law ofArmed Conflict at the
Operational and Tactical Levels, joint Doctrine Manual, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 (Aug 13, 2001); UK
Ministry of Defense, The Joint Service Manual(cited in note 139).
143

See generally Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffJoint Operations § 5.A.2.b., Joint Publication 3-0
(Aug 11, 2011); Anne E. Story and Aryea Gottlieb, Beyond the Range of Military Options, Joint Force
Quarterly (1995), online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq-pubs/2309.pdf (visited Oct 16,
2011). Both discuss the current range of military operations.
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See generally Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrinefor Military Operations Other Than
online
at
J-7
(June
16
1995),
War,
joint
Publication
http://ids.nic.in/Jt/ 20Doctrine/oint/20Pub/ 203-0MOOTW.pdf (visited Oct 16,2011).
Dept of Def Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Pgram, 4.1(May 9, 2006).
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benefits of a single legal paradigm. Though not done as a matter of law, and not
recognizably steeped in the theory of agency, the practical effect of the DoD
policy is that the US is already complying with the agency theory and would
require little adaptation to apply it as a matter of law.
The US' experience is not unique. In a recent study concerning the
customary nature of the LOAC, the ICRC analyzed state practice and then
articulated its analysis of what principles of the LOAC could be considered
customary.14 While not all states agreed with the ICRC's conclusions, 147 the
study found that most of the customary provisions of IAC concerning targeting
and the treatment of the victims of armed conflict were being applied equally in

NIAC by states. 148
In combination with the ICRC's conclusions, the fact that one of the most
active and most capable militaries in the world has decided to implement policies
that have the effect of applying the agency theory to military operations should
not be discounted as insignificant. Rather, it should be persuasive that a
transition to agency theory would not only be legally more justified but also that
such a transition would not be difficult.
E. Issues
Though applying the agency theory to LOAC applicability would certainly
increase protections for victims of armed conflict and decrease the
manipulability of law application, several issues would still need to be addressed.
As will be described below, these issues are also not adequately addressed by the
current paradigm.
1. Areas of special concern.
There are some areas of special concern that states might consider too
binding. One example might be the limitation on certain weapons systems, such
as riot control agents, which are common in the arsenal of domestic police
forces but which many countries have agreed to not use against opposing forces
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See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, 1 & 2 Customay International
Humanitarian Law, Vols I and II (Cambridge 2005) (describing rules governing the law of armed
conflict in Vol 1, which are supported by annotated State practice in Vol 2).
See John B. Bellinger III and William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International

Committee of the Red Cross Study Customaoy InternationalHumanitananLaw, 89 Intl Rev Red Cross 443,
457 (2007) (cataloguing the US' concerns with the study).
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For a fist of the Rules that includes a designation as to which rules apply to IAC, NIAC, or both,
see generally Henchaerts and Doswald-Beck, eds, 1 Customat InternationalHumanitarianLaw (cited
in note 146).
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in armed conflict. 4 911n this case, the Chemical Weapons Convention would not
prevent a military from using riot control agents in situations other than as a
method of warfare.so As an example, the military of Mexico would be precluded
from using riot control agents against the cartel forces while conducting
hostilities, but could still use them in other situations.
As mentioned above, another example of the application of LOAC that
might cause some concern to states is detention and treatment of detainees.
Under an agency theory, the armed forces would treat all detainees in
compliance with the appropriate Geneva Convention.1 s' However, this would
not preclude appropriate criminal proceedings for those who violate applicable
law, whether international or domestic in character. Detention of a criminal by
armed forces in a domestic environment does not prevent the transfer of that
criminal to a domestic criminal system where he may be tried for his criminal
activities.15 2 Further, even those held as prisoners of war can be tried for certain
criminal acts and crimes in violation of the laws of war."s5
2. Reciprocity with non-state actors.
An agency theory of LOAC applicability will also not solve the problem of
non-state organized armed groups who refuse to comply with the LOAC. The
agency theory's roots in the concept of sovereignty place ultimate importance on
the grant of sovereign authority to the armed forces as the basis for the
privileges and responsibilities contained in the LOAC. Since non-state organized
armed groups by definition do not represent a state, agency theory would have
no claim on getting the armed groups to comply. Unfortunately, the current
LOAC regime also does not encourage non-state reciprocity. Rather, there is a
compelling argument made by numerous scholars and members of the military
that the current LOAC regime in fact encourages non-compliance and
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See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Res No 47/39, UN Doc
A/RES/47/39 (1992).
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Id at Art 1.5.
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See Geneva Conventions (cited in note 7).

152

See Stewart, 85 Intl Rev Red Cross at 320 (cited in note 31) ("Most significant from a political
perspective is the fact that there is no requirement in either common article 3 or Additional
Protocol II that affords combatants prisoner-of-warstatus in non-international armed conflicts, nor
is there anything preventing parties from prosecuting enemy combatants in those circumstances
for having taken up arms."). But see Bellinger and Padmanabhan, 105 Am J Intl L at 208-09
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incentivizes fighters to use the LOAC as a shield to give them an advantage
when fighting compliant forces. 15 4
However, as recently noted by Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran,
there are many examples of non-state armed groups voluntarily taking on LOAC
responsibilities.' This is an important development in the LOAC and would be
welcomed under the sovereign agency theory also. Unilateral but binding
statements by organized armed groups that they will apply the full LOAC should
be welcomed by all participants in armed conflicts.
3. Working with law enforcement.
A final problem arises where armed forces and other state forces, such as
police or border control personnel, would be required to work together against a
particular armed group, such as is currently occurring in Mexico.'5 6 Applying an
agency theory of LOAC could result in different groups of state forces who are
fighting side by side being governed by different sets of rules. This type of
situation may make a state vulnerable to the potential for political manipulation.
For example, if military forces are functioning where use of force as a first resort
is authorized, a savvy government might ensure there are military intermixed
with the local police so that the military can begin engagements, triggering the
ability for the police to respond in self defense or defense of others.
The potential for such problems is undeniable and cannot be ignored.
However, the intensity and scope of the conflict will have had to reach a certain
level for the government to deploy its military. Given the level historically
required to do that, it is likely that the opposing groups have sufficient firepower
to warrant such a response. In the instances that this is not true, the government
is certainly capable of controlling this situation by enacting its own situational
restraints through rules of engagement.
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do deserve consideration when contemplating the
theory of LOAC applicability, they do not present
The fact that the current LOAC paradigm is also
these problems is some indication of the difficult

VI. THE WAY AHEAD
't is all war, whatever its cause or object, and should be conducted in a civi/ized ay ...

There is no distinctionfrom a military view between a civil war and aforeign war until
afterthe final decisive battle."158

While this agency theory may seem revolutionary, and it is certainly a
revolutionary change in the current view of LOAC applicability, it is simply a
return to the roots of the LOAC. As such, there are already many practices in
place, and some developing, that presage a transition from the current bifurcated
LOAC applicability paradigm to one of agency theory. State practice,
international jurisprudence, and the work of scholars are already subtly moving
the law in that direction.
A. State Practice
As mentioned above," 9 the diversity of missions conducted by modern
militaries has already driven state practice, as a matter of policy, to embrace the
principles of the sovereign agency theory. The US has made it an official
policyo and customary practice seems to be collapsing the difference between
JAC and NIAC. As state practice continues in this direction, it will make the
transition to application of the full LOAC to all forceful operations of state
armed forces much less difficult.

158

15
160

sets out a methodology for establishing mission-specific ROE. The document is designed to
"establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US
commanders and their forces during all military operations and contingencies and routine Military
Department functions occurring outside US territory." Compendium of Current Chairman Joint
15,
2009),
online
at
Directives
*17
(jan
Chiefs
of
Staff
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs-directives/support/ccs/cjcsi-comp.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011). There
are additional rules for the application of force within the US, which are contained in later
enclosures.
Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict 12 (Cambridge 2002), quoting Hannis Taylor, A
Treatise on InternationalPublic Law 454 (Callaghan 1901).
See Section V.D.
See Dept of Def Directive 2311.01 E, 14.1 (cited in note 145).
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B. International Jurisprudence
International courts have also expressed dissatisfaction with the bifurcation
of the LOAC and have been slowly eroding the differences between IAC and
NIAC. The ICTY has been especially proactive in this area. In several cases, it
has been called on to determine which law applied to a particular aspect of an
armed conflict and has struggled with doing so. Perhaps in response to this
recognized difficulty, the ICTY has consistently narrowed the gap between the
law applicable in IACs and NIACs.
For example, in Tadid, the Appeals Chamber held that customary rules
governing internal conflicts include:
[P]rotection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate
attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property,
protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in
hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in
international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting
hostilities.16'
Antonio Cassese, who was then president of the ICTY, concluded that "there
has been a convergence of the two bodies on international law with the result
that internal strife is now governed to a large extent by the rules and principles
which had traditionally only applied to international conflicts."1 62
International jurisprudence, while not yet conclusive, is clearly trending
toward a union of the IAC and NIAC rules. This demonstrates the lack of utility
in continuing the differentiation between IAC and NIAC as the source for
determining LOAC applicability. If the substantive differences have mostly lost
their meaning, then the effort spent determining which law to apply is
unnecessary.
C. Scholars
Many scholars agree with the international courts in this area. Perhaps the
most profound statement on the growing convergence between the IAC and
NIAC is International Institute of Humanitarian Law's Manual on the Law of
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Tadi at 1127 (cited in note 87). However, the same court also held "this extension [of IAC rules]
has not taken place in the form of full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal
conflicts; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may
contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts." Id at 126.
Stewart, 85 Ind Rev Red Cross at 322 (cited in note 31). But see id at 323 (quoting Tad&i to say,
"this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules
into internal conflicts; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation
they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts").
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Non-International Armed Conflict.163 Written by Yoram Dinstein, Charles H.B.
Garraway, and Michael N. Schmitt, the manual "is a guide for behaviour in
action during non-international armed conflict. While not a comprehensive
restatement of law applicable in such conflicts, it nevertheless reflects the key
principles contained in that law.""' An analysis of these "key principles" shows
a distinct similarity to the IAC principles of LOAC, purposefully demonstrating
the general application of these rules to armed conflict. For example, though the
manual specifically deals with NIAC, the authors often quote API as the source
for the rules in the manual.16

Similarly, in its Customary Law Study, the ICRC found that numerous
provisions of Protocol II are customary international law and apply in all armed
conflicts."' Each of these provisions has a corollary in IAC, further
strengthening the claim of a narrowing gap.
D. Further Actions
With states' armies applying the agency theory as a matter of policy, and
with that policy supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals and the
writings of eminent scholars, the way ahead is easily envisioned. States need to
embrace the agency theory of LOAC applicability and apply the full LOAC, as a
matter of law, to every employment of their armed forces to a mission where
those armed forces are expected to use violence. Such a transformation would
increase the clarity for militaries during armed conflict and eliminate the
likelihood of conflict classification manipulation.
Practically, how should this transformation to a sovereign agency theory
occur? States who are already applying the theory as a matter of policy, such as
163

Michael N. Schmitt, Yoram Dinstein and Charles H.B. Garraway, The Manual on the Lax of NonInternationalArmed Conflict: With Commentary (International Institute of Humanitarian Law 2006),
online at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/NIACManuallYBHR15th.pdf (visited Nov 19,
2011).
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Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, eds, 1 Customary InternationalHumanitarianLap (cited in note 146).
The provisions include the prohibition of attacks on civilians (Rule 1); the obligation to respect
and protect medical personnel, units, and transports, and religious personnel (Rules 25-26, 2830); the obligation to protect medical personnel (Rules 26, 30); the prohibition of starvation as a
method of warfare (Rule 53); the prohibition of attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population (Rule 54); the obligation to respect the fundamental guarantees of civilians
and persons hors de combat (Rules 87-105); the obligation to search for and respect and protect the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked (Rules 109-11); the obligation to search for and protect the dead
(Rules 112-13); the obligation to protect persons deprived of their liberty (Rules 118-19, 121,
125); the prohibition of forced movement of civilians (Rule 129); and protections afforded to
women and children (Rules 134-37). Id.
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the US, could call for a Convention and propose a revision of the Geneva
Conventions to accomplish this purpose. While this course of action could be
very effective, it is highly unlikely. Perhaps more likely, states could make
unilateral decisions to apply the full LOAC as a matter of law each time they
or
employ their armed forces and either make those decisions public'
incorporate this decision in their own domestic laws. As states embrace the
sovereign agency theory, they could apply pressure on allies and others to do so
also. In the end, individual state practice will be the most effective mechanism to
accomplish this task over time. Eventually, API and APII would have to be
significantly revised or abrogated in order to remove the codification of the
LOAC bifurcation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current LOAC applicability paradigm requires a state to classify the
conflict and then determine what law applies based on that determination.
Though this may appear to be a legal determination, history has demonstrated
that the state's decision has been open to manipulation in order to accomplish
policy objectives. The political manipulation of LOAC applicability, such as the
2002 decision by the Bush administration concerning the application of the law
to the treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees, has contributed to the
degradation in protection of the victims of armed conflict. It is time for the
international community to rethink the current paradigm and select a more
effective and principled basis for LOAC applicability.
The application of the LOAC to all activities by state sovereign forces
during armed conflict is a much more effective means of protecting the victims
of armed conflict and will provide a much more solid foundation upon which to
place the LOAC. The fundamental principles of the LOAC, such as distinction
and combatant immunity, are based on the monopolization of violence through
the grant of agency from the sovereign to its armed forces. It seems appropriate,
then, that anytime the state employs its armed forces to accomplish its violent
ends, the rights and responsibilities of the sovereign's war-making powers
should attend the use of force by the state's agents. Therefore, each time the
armed forces of a state are used to conduct forceful operations, the full LOAC
should be applied to their activities.
Perhaps most importantly (given recent history), tying the LOAC
applicability to agency theory and the use of a sovereign's armed forces will
diminish the potential for political manipulation of the law. Currently a state can
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deploy its armed forces and determine which law accompanies the military in its
use of force. The law should not be so manipulable.
Given current state practice, the jurisprudence of international tribunals,
and the work of international law scholars, the transition to an agency paradigm
from a conflict typology paradigm would not require significant effort. For
States such as the US, it would merely require the commitment to do, as a matter
of law, what they are now doing as a matter of policy. Regardless of the effort,
an agency theory of LOAC applicability would return the LOAC to its historical
roots of sovereignty and advance the protections for victims of armed conflict
that history has so carefully fostered.
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